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Abstract 
Federalism as a political idea has become increasingly important as a way of peacefully reconciling the 
principles of unity and diversity typically in multi-national states. Actually, federalism is not a universal remedy 
for all challenges of ethnic diversity or ethnic conflicts rather it has considered as a means to achieve the end 
particularly in ethnically heterogeneous states. Therefore, the very objective of this paper is to critically examine 
the actual practices of unity in diversity at Benishangul-Gumuz regional state (hereafter used as BGRS). In this 
context, this paper investigate in detail policies and institutions designed for accommodation of ethnic diversity 
in the study region. Based on the information gained through the various research instruments the writer 
concluded that non-indigenous ethnic groups are in a better manner accommodated at Kebele level of 
government than Woreda and regional levels of government in BGRS. Therefore, failure to adequately 
accommodate non-indigenous ethnic groups particularly in the regional legislative and executive organs and 
Woreda executive organ of the government in its part challenging the unity of BGRS.  
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1. Introduction  
Diversity as a social fact always exists everywhere in the world. But in most countries ethno-linguistic diversities 
have been considered as a burden to realize state unity. As a result states have attempted to adopt a nation-state 
project, which is one culture, one language and one nation to achieve national unity at the expense of their 
existing diversities. Similarly, in the previous regimes of Ethiopia, ethnic diversity was considered as a burden 
hence a nation state project was dominantly accepted project to achieve national unity. In fact, there are two 
main reasons why diversity within the state territory becomes a problem. First, when the social, cultural, or racial 
differences become the basis of group inequality. Second, when the different groups perceive one another as 
inferiors or superiors (Majeed et al. in Watts and Chattopadhyay, 2008, ed).  
It is fact that, diversity is one of the most contested issues in domestic and international politics (Moreno 
and Colino, 2010: 3). Hence, in current political dynamics managing diversity has emerged as the foremost 
overarching and urgent issue basically in multi-ethnic states. Questions concerning how diversities should be 
recognized and accommodated in ethno-linguistically and culturally heterogeneous states are among the most 
important political agenda for democratic and democratizing societies today (Gutmann, 1994; Assefa, 2007). 
Currently, accommodation of diversity has been salient issues either in developed or developing states.  
The overarching aim why ethnic federalism has been opted in Ethiopia since 1991 was primarily to respond 
to the past ethno-cultural injustice. Means federalism as the institutional arrangement has selected primarily to 
realize the challenges of ethnic diversity. For example, according to FDRE constitution every nation, nationality 
and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish 
institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal 
governments (Art 39(3)). In a similar vein, BGRS constitution also clearly recognized that the government shall 
promote and support the people’s self-rule at all levels of government and also respect the identity of 
nationalities and peoples of the region (refer Art 110 (1 and 2) of BGRS constitution). Accordingly, the 
government shall have the duty to strengthen ties of equality, unity and fraternity among the nationalities and 
peoples of the region (ibid).  
The institutional accommodation and fair representation of ethnic cleavages of the regional state can be 
used as the best indicator for the inclusive political participation of the existing diversity in the region. The 
institutional response that suggests a state to move away from the nation-state paradigm towards a politics of 
recognition and accommodation, is presented as a promising alternative in diversified states (Yonatan, 2008). A 
corollary of the decision to adopt the principle of recognition is the espousal of institutional measures that 
supplement the act of recognition and provide the practical effect thereto (ibid).  
There are various mechanisms that can be used to manage ethnic diversity in multi-ethnic states. But under 
this paper constitutional and institutional mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic diversity will be selected and 
analyzed. Hence, the writer assesses the institutional structure and how BGRS recognizes and accommodates its 
multi-ethnic nature and how this is translated into different regional and local institutional realities. And also the 
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paper tries to assess how the institutional principles of self-rule and shared-rule matrix can and have been 
translated into institutional arrangements practically in the region to realise the capacity of federalism to the 
challenges of ethnic diversity in the region.  
To this end, this study has addressed the following key research questions: How could the imperatives of 
regional unity and diversity be reconciled in the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State? Has Benishangul Gumuz 
Regional State Constitution provided a legal and institutional framework for accommodating the diverse groups 
in the region? And what does the trend look like so far? 
 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are: 
1) To examine whether the imperatives of regional unity and diversity are reconciled or not practically 
under Benishangul Gumuz regional state. 
2) To investigate in detail policies and institutions designed for accommodation of ethnic diversity in 
Benishangul Gumuz regional state. 
 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
In order to achieve the intended purpose, it is mandatory to clearly explain the appropriate methodology used in 
this scientific study. The strategy preferred to perform this inquiry was a mixed method design specifically 
concurrent embedded design. Under this inquiry both qualitative and quantitative data were collected 
simultaneously. In fact, in this study priority was given to qualitative data. They were supported through analysis 
of quantitative data. Therefore, in order to obtain qualitative data, in depth-individual interview, personal 
observation, different legal and other document analysis were conducted. Here, qualitative approach was 
selected as a primary method because of its holistic and flexible nature; hence, the participants had the 
opportunity to respond more elaborately and in-greater detail. While, in this study quantitative data were 
collected through a survey questionnaire.  
The research targeted all different ethnic groups residing in the region permanently for a long period and 
new migrants. It was very difficult to collect data from each of the 20 Woredas of the region. Therefore, 5 
Woredas were selected purposely because of the nature and magnitude of ethnic diversity in the region. More 
specifically, at the Asossa Zone (Bambasi and Assosa Woredas) were selected as sample study. At the Metekel 
Zone (Dangur, Debati and Wombera Woreda) were selected as sample study.  
More specifically, the target respondents in this study were higher officials at the regional level and the 
advisors of regional president, the regional state council advisors, residents of different ethnic groups in the 
region, members of regional and local levels of government executive and legislative councils, and ruling and 
opposition party leaders and members. Thus, the respondent selection technique was mainly based on purposive 
and convenience sampling techniques. These were selected because knowledgeable persons with the desired 
expertise were to be appropriate for the purpose at hand.  
The researcher used a table produced by (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970 quoted in Cohen et al., 2000: 94) to 
determine the sample size for a survey questionnaire under this study. Accordingly, out of the total public 
servants of 25982 (in the year of 2016), a sample of 379 respondents was randomly taken for a survey 
questionnaire. In this context, before beginning to distribute the questionnaire, two general categories of people 
to whom the questionnaire should be distributed were categorized. The target groups included indigenous ethnic 
groups from the regional government civil servants to the lower levels of government unit, and from non-
indigenous ethnic groups who are regional government civil servants similarly from the regional to the lower 
levels of the government unit. Therefore, 52.2% survey respondents were from indigenous ethnic groups while 
47.8% were from non-indigenous ethnic groups.  
 
1.3 Meaning of Indigenousness in BGRS Context  
In fact, as for many other terminologies, there is no universally accepted identification criterion to determine 
certain society as indigenous and others as non-indigenous under every state (Muluneh, 2017). “The term 
indigenous punctuates the political landscape in developed and developing countries, in the East and in the West 
(ibid). Its politics revolve around four different types of claims: participation and representation; access to 
resources; autonomy and self-government; and the protection of language and culture” (Jung, 2008: 184). 
BGRS connotes early inhabitants and to emphasize their status as a people living in the place prior to 
subsequent settlement and who identified themselves, as part of politically, economically and socially 
marginalized groups during the former regimes (Muluneh, 2017). The interviewees also described that the major 
reason why the term indigenous has been incorporated vividly in the regional constitution is likely to promote 
the rights to autonomy or self-government in the matter relating to their internal and local affairs and freely 
pursue their own traditional institutions, economic, political, social and cultural development in the region (ibid). 
The indigenous ethnic groups’ historic marginalization and isolation from the center may be addressed by the 
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regional action and hence explicit constitutional recognition of indigenous ethnic groups signifies the practical 
steps of the region to protect ethnic rights (ibid).  
The minutes of the Constitutional Assembly held in Assosa 03/12/2002 also reveal a somewhat similar 
viewpoint as that of the interviewees. As per this minute, the term indigenous peoples in BGRS is described as:  
People inhabiting the region in primacy was considered as indigenous to the region, but one thing 
everyone should remember here is that other Ethiopian people’s rather than indigenous ethnic 
groups were not considered as an oddity and migrant they are Ethiopian (for further information 
refer appendix-6, Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly held in 03/12/2002, Assosa, Volume 1, 
here the Amharic version was translated by the researcher).  
The main assumption and description concerning the meaning of indigenous peoples by the minute of the 
conference is quite clear (Muluneh, 2017). As per the minute of the conference, the major criterion to describe 
and determine peoples of the region as indigenous and other peoples are their early settlement in the area (i.e. 
Benishangul Gumuz Region). In addition to this, their historic claim to a historic and particularly strong bond 
with certain territories they have occupied before the establishment of the federal state structure in the country 
and seek to enhance the maintenance of their cultural identities of indigenous peoples including land rights and 
political/territorial autonomies is also a significant part of dichotomization (ibid).  
Therefore, based on the above information, the researcher claimed that the term indigenous is a politically 
constructed ethnic identity by the concerted effort of the then political actors as a strategy to promote access to 
political power in the region.  
 
1.4 Mechanisms of Management of Diversity  
Basically, in African states, diversities are considered as a burden. However, diversity as a social fact always 
existed in the world-at-large, but it becomes a “problem” mainly when it exists within the territory of a state 
(Majeed et al in Watts and Chattopadhyay, 2008, ed.). Hence, in the current political dynamics, managing 
diversity has emerged as the foremost overarching and urgent issue in ethnically heterogeneous states. There are 
different methods that can be used to manage ethnic diversity in ethnically heterogeneous states. For instance, 
containment approach, assimilationist strategy, power sharing, providing autonomy, representation, and 
recognition. In fact, both containment and assimilationist approaches are pernicious strategies. 
In Ethiopia, federalism as the institutional arrangement has been opted primarily to address the challenges 
of ethnic diversity. The regional states are also responsible to recognize and promote the existing diversity based 
on their own local context. When seeking better constitutional accommodation within a multinational state, the 
aspirations of sub-state national societies touch upon both legal and political elements (Stephen, 2004). One 
example of the former is the amendment (or the re-interpretation) of the formal constitution, whereas the 
political elements can be identified in the refinement of constitutional conventions, practices and principles, or 
the political culture and value system informing the given constitution (ibid). There are three major areas to 
which sub-state national societies aspire regarding constitutional accommodation. Such as providing autonomy, 
representation, and recognition of their diverse features (ibid).  
1.4.1 Providing Autonomy 
As Stephen (2004) observes, it is in the context of autonomy that sub-state ethnic groups demand asymmetry or 
otherwise said self-governing rights. Autonomy in this context means that regional or sub-national societies 
might seek additional or distinctive powers in comparison to the rest of the country, and these powers shall be 
constitutionally entrenched. These powers usually allow regional societies to autonomously manage specific 
issues that are of particular interest to them and that are limited to domestic policy areas (from education to 
social policies, economic development and cultural aspects, etc.) (Nicola & Lecours, 2008). In other words, these 
groups demand some form of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free 
development of their cultures and the best interest of their people (Kymlicka, 1995). Some scholars have talked 
in this regard of strengthening the minorities’ voice at the periphery (Nicola & Lecours, 2008) and this can be 
done through different tools, including devolution of powers or a federal system (in cases where a federal 
structure is not yet in place) (ibid). In both cases, this solution might entail a significant change in the structure 
of the state (ibid). 
1.4.2 Representation  
Here the representation refers to situations where the ethnic diversity inherent in the regional state is reflected 
within regional and local institutions; in other words, the presence of representatives of the different ethnic 
groups within regional and local institutions is enhanced. In this regard enhancing the voice of each ethnic group 
at the regional state, so that the regional state is no longer construed of as a single ethnic community, but is 
perceived as a compact of peoples. Hence, representation occurs in different ways. There can be the creation of 
regional bureaucratic position designed to the regional ethnic diversity. It can also occur with the creation of the 
regional chamber representing the interests of different cleavages of the region or through some form of 
representation within the constitutional interpretation council of the region. It might also take the shape of a 
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share of parliamentary seats for ethnic groups (emphasis added). 
1.4.3 Recognition  
The struggle of sub-state ethnic groups for enhanced or better recognition is an issue that is intimately linked to 
the autonomy and representation (Stephen, 2004). Usually, with this notion, scholars refer to the aspiration of 
constitutional recognition of the language of the sub-state national society or of some other symbolic issues such 
as flags, anthems or other totems (ibid). In multinational states or federations, where the linguistic cleavage is a 
major component, official bi- or multi-lingualism is actually a preferred tool to give minorities a platform to 
express their voice at the centre, and this type of policy can also increase minority representation in such 
institutions such as parliament, the courts, the army and the bureaucracy, as it facilitates the advancement for 
linguistic minorities (Nicola & Lecours, 2008). In other words, recognition is intimately related to the very 
essence of the alleged distinctiveness of the sub-state national group, its behaviors, traditions, and traits that 
allow clearly identifying and singling out one sub-state national group from the others. In very general terms, 
Taylor praises recognition as it partially shapes one’s identity; consequently, [n]onrecognition or misrecognition 
can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being (Taylor, 1994:25). Due recognition becomes for Taylor a “vital human need” (ibid: 26). 
 
1.5 Overview of Administrative Arrangement of BGRS Government  
The constitution of BGRS has clearly stated that the regional government shall be organized with four 
hierarchically structured tiers of government. These are regional government, nationality administration, Woreda 
and Kebele administrations (Art 45(1) of BGRS constitution). All these tiers of government under the region 
have been empowered to have their own legislative, executive as well as judicial institutions under their 
respective jurisdictions. But in contrast the practice on the ground indicates that the regional state has preferred 
to establish the region with three de facto administrative Zones (Metekel, Assosa and Kemashi Zones) rather 
than nationality administration as per constitutional decree. Accordingly, under these three Zonal administrations 
there are 20 Woreda and 475 Kebele administrations. Actually, all tiers of government have their own 
institutions and agencies in which decisions and decision-making processes are carried out in BGRS. In this 
regard, except de facto Zone, constitutionally all administrative hierarchies beginning from the region down to 
the Kebele level have their own legislative, executive and judicial institutions.  
 
1.6 Regional Legislative Organ and Ethnic Composition  
According to FDRE constitution states have law making power over certain subject-matter provided to them. In 
this regard, for instance Art 52 of FDRE constitution stipulates that states shall have the power to enact and 
execute the state constitution and other laws, in addition to residual powers. Each state is allotted with the right 
to adopt its own constitution and thereby structure its own political institutions to embrace diverse ethnic groups’ 
self-administration in a particular territory. Hence, in the Ethiopian federation, regions were created with 
legislative, executive and judicial functions in their respective jurisdiction.  
The legislative authority of each state government is vested in the hands of the state council, which is also 
the highest organ in the region. It is also a unicameral chamber. The regional council is a body directly elected 
through the plurality electoral system. The members of this council are representatives of the people of the 
regional state as a whole, and they are elected for a term of five years through direct elections. Regional state 
council is the representative of the nation, nationalities of the regional state and its members are accountable to 
the people, and constitution and their conscience (see Proclamation No. 31 /2002, Article 48 (3) of BGRS. Thus, 
currently, the BGRS council consists of 99 councilors elected directly by the people through free, direct and fair 
elections by secret ballot for a term of five years in each electoral district by using the FPTP electoral system 
(see Art 48(1&2) of BGRS constitution).  
In accordance with the regional constitution, regional legislative council (regional parliament) is 
empowered to call chief executive bodies (i.e. the regional president and vice- presidents) and other regional 
officials for questioning and to investigate the executive’s conduct and the discharge of its responsibilities (Art 
49(3)/17 of BGRS constitution). Here, it is quite clear that in addition to the preparation of regional policies and 
laws, the regional legislative council has the power of oversight or follow-up the activities of executive council 
basically the implementation of laws and policies by the concerned body in the region. 
Art 39(3) of FDRE constitution unequivocally recognized “every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia 
has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government 
in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal government.” As a matter of 
fact, BGRS is ethnically diversified region hence, the regional institutional design should promote inclusiveness 
by reflecting the region’s ethnic diversity and enhancing inclusive decision-making. Because, in multi-ethnic 
states an institutional design that echoes the existing diversities by using various mechanisms which protect the 
interest of diverse ethnic groups at different levels of government has been considered as one basic means to 
enhance peaceful coexistence among the ethnic segments.  
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In fact, in this context, it is widely accepted by political analysts and policy-makers that federalism with 
genuine power-sharing is the most viable democratic means of managing conflict in countries with deep 
divisions, where ethno-nationalist groups are politically mobilized and identity is politically salient. Power 
sharing is necessary to prevent dominant groups or communities from subjugating others. In this regard, Lijphart 
explains that: 
It is in the nature of consociational democracy, at least initially, to make plural societies more 
thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize 
them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy. (1977, p. 42) 
Therefore, the establishment and strengthening of the power-sharing mechanisms in different institutions 
from the local to the federal level in diversified state seems a precondition for cementing unity in diversity and 
cementing democracy at all levels. This principle can be broadened to state that regional institutions should 
reflect existing diversity on the ground. In this context, BGRS constitution generally accredited special 
representation of numerically minor indigenous ethnic groups and non-indigenous ethnic groups in the regional 
council. For instance, more specifically Art 48 (2) and 45 (3) of BGRS constitution respectively declare that the 
representation of Mao and Komo nationalities and other people of the region in the regional council shall be 
given special consideration where the details are to be decided by law but till now the law has not been enacted 
by the region.   
In spite of this fact, data gathered by the researcher (2016) reveal that the current practice shows that out of 
the total 99 seats of the regional legislative council 40 are reserved for Bertha, 35 are reserved for Gumuz, 11 are 
reserved for Shinasha, 2 are reserved for Mao and 2 for Komo and the remaining 9 seats are reserved for non-
indigenous ethnic groups by the ‘quota’ base. In fact, the base of this quota system is not the imperative of 
regional constitutional and other legal document, rather it has been the voluntary decision of the regionally based 
ruling political party to accommodate non-indigenous ethnic groups in BGRS. Here it is quite clear that, 90 seats 
were reserved for indigenous ethnic groups while only 9 seats were reserved for non-indigenous ethnic groups.  
Thus, indigenous ethnic groups had a majority of representation and seats compared to non-indigenous 
ethnic groups in the regional council. In addition to this, currently non-indigenous ethnic groups were also 
represented in the regional legislative council standing committees. Consequently, out of the total 22 members of 
all standing committees in the regional legislative council 16 were nominated from indigenous ethnic groups 
while 6 members were nominated from the non-indigenous ethnic groups. At this point it is quite clear that, 
indigenous ethnic groups had a majority of representation and seats compared to non-indigenous ethnic groups in 
the regional council.  
Therefore, based on the above empirical information one cannot argue that non-indigenous ethnic groups 
are fairly represented in the regional council in accordance with their high population number in the region. 
Actually, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in regional council is not proportional. But in 
contrast, quite obviously, effective representation of various ethnic groups in various regional institutions has a 
profound effect to enhance the sense of regional unity in diversity. This means, among other things, in multi-
ethnic constituent units the representation and inclusion of ethnic diversity is considered as glue to enhance sense 
of regional unity, consequently it has the potential to minimize or eliminate ethnic conflict/tension.  
In addition to information gained through interviews, this study attempted to survey the existing perception 
of civil servants concerning the representation of ethnic diversities in the regional legislative council and its 
effect on regional unity of BGRS. Accordingly, the survey result shows that currently the restriction of the 
representation of non-indigenous people in the regional legislative council has been perceived as one major 
source of regional disunity. For instance, the results in the table 1.3 below show that a significant majority 
(62.3%) of the respondents viewed that absence of proportional representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups 
under the regional legislative council in BGRS was a source of regional disunity, while few respondents (28.5%) 
did not agree that this was a source of regional disunity in BGRS.  
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Table 1.3. The Perception of Civil Servants Regarding the Effect of Absence of Proportional Representation of 
Ethnic Diversities in Regional Legislative Council vis-à-vis Regional Unity in BGRS.   
{QUESTION}: In your perception, absence of adequate representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in the 
regional legislative council is conceived as a source to regional disunity? 
 
 
 
Valid 
Rank Scale Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 128 33.8 34.9 34.9 
Agree 108 28.5 29.4 64.3 
Undecided 23 6.1 6.3 70.6 
Disagree 92 24.3 25.1 95.6 
Strongly disagree 16 4.2 4.4 100.0 
Total 367 96.8 100.0  
Missing System  12 3.2   
Total  379 100.0   
Source: Survey data, 2016-2017 
Yet, the quota system designed and practiced to ensure non-indigenous ethnic group’s participation in the 
regional legislative council has not adequately addressed their interest in BGRS. The main rationale behind the 
restriction of non-indigenous ethnic group representation in the regional political institutions was basically to 
break the non-indigenous ethnic group monopoly on regional government jobs and the regional economy. In fact, 
yet, in BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups have significantly dominated the business sectors in the region 
(Interview conducted with expert in the regional trade, industry and transport bureau (2017), Assosa). Beside this, 
most of the civil service and judiciary institution’s expertise positions were highly dominated by members of 
non-indigenous ethnic groups. The participation of indigenous ethnic groups in civil service, judicial positions 
and business sectors are still minimal in BGRS. In this regard, the regional government position was that it is one 
basic mechanism to counterbalance the socio-economic dominance of non-indigenous ethnic groups in BGRS.  
Indeed, in BGRS context, enabling the over representation of indigenous ethnic groups in the regional political 
institutions has profound implication to eliminate the effects of previous regime’s socio-economic and political 
marginalization. Despite this fact, in BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups felt the need for proportional 
representation in regional political institutions. For instance, in support of the above statements, interview 
conducted with higher regional officials uniformly substantiate that:  
Notwithstanding, the fact that until now, non-indigenous ethnic groups have a political request for 
proportional representation in political institutions at different levels of government, the main reason 
why the regional government deliberately restricted the representation of non-indigenous in political 
institutions at different levels of government in the region was taken as ‘a special mechanism’ to 
counterbalance the socioeconomic domination of non-indigenous ethnic groups in the regional state. 
Nevertheless, yet both inadequate representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in political 
institutions and the prevalence of socio-economic inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous 
ethnic groups have in its part significantly affected the enter-ethnic unity in the region (Interview 
conducted with officials(2016), Assosa).  
Actually, in BGRS there exists a high socio-economic disparity between indigenous and non-indigenous 
ethnic groups in the region. For instance, illiteracy level is still quite high among indigenous ethnic groups 
compared with non-indigenous in the region. Indeed, the literacy rate is one basic indicator of socioeconomic 
development among the society. Yet, as stated above in BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups have significantly 
dominated the business sectors in the region. Beside this, currently most of the civil service and judiciary 
positions are highly dominated by non-indigenous ethnic groups. The participation of indigenous ethnic groups 
in civil service, judicial positions and business sectors are still minimal in BGRS. Here, the prevalence of socio-
economic disparity among the ethnic groups has been considered as one major issue which challenges the 
promotion of inter-ethnic unity.  
Beside this, another key issue hindering the effective representation of various ethnic groups in the 
legislative council at different levels of government in Ethiopia in general and BGRS in particular is the adopted 
electoral system. Though currently there are attempts of modifying it, Ethiopia has been using the “first-past-the-
post” electoral system which simply states that one who receives the simple majority of votes within the electoral 
district will be the winner (see Proclamation No 532/2007, Art 25). The regional states are not allowed to 
formulate their own electoral system in contemporary Ethiopia. The power to enact laws concerning elections so 
as to give practical effect to the political rights is the duty of the federal government (see Art 51(15) of FDRE 
Constitution). Thus, adopting a uniform electoral system throughout the country without considering the 
particular situation of the regional states has bad effects on the representation of each ethnic group at different 
levels of government in the multi-ethnic areas.  
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Hence, the “first-past-the-post” electoral system for electing the regional legislative council representatives 
in BGRS has the potential to exclude ethnic communities in the legislative council. In fact, special representation 
of ethnic minorities is recognized in BGRS constitution, but the actual scheme used to choose the representatives 
contradicts the intention of genuine ethnic representation. For instance, on this issue, some of the interview 
respondents alluded that the dominant regional political party/BGPDP, which belongs to indigenous ethnic 
groups has implicitly set perquisite criteria to choose the representatives of non-indigenous ethnic groups in 
accordance with BGPDP loyalty which is actually opposed to genuine representation of ethnic diversity.  
As stated elsewhere in this paper, actual ethnic representation and participation in local political institutions 
will enable all ethnic groups to take charge of their own affairs and simultaneously it enhances harmony among 
the ethnic groups. In multi-ethnic areas as much as possible all ethnic groups should effectively be included in 
various political institutions at different levels of government, which has the potential to minimize or eliminate 
ethnic conflict/tension. However, the practice on the ground in BGRS shows that, the participation of non-
indigenous ethnic groups in regional legislative council have been restricted. In this context, beside others one 
key issue hindering the effective representation of various ethnic groups in the legislative council at different 
levels of government in Ethiopia in general and BGRS in particular is the adopted electoral system.  
The “first-past-the-post” electoral system for electing the regional, Woreda and Kebele legislative council 
representatives in BGRS has the potential to exclude ethnic communities in the legislative council. Therefore, 
biased legislative council formation, mainly as a result of the “first-past-the-post” electoral mode of choosing 
nominees in ethnically diversified state, may further exclude non-indigenous ethnic groups in the executive 
council by using the system of executive council formation policies possibly aimed at the exclusion of non-
indigenous ethnic communities in BGRS. 
1.6.2 Regional Executive Organ and Ethnic Composition 
Art 57(1) of BGRS constitution stipulates that “the executive power of the region is vested in the chief executive 
and the executive council.” The composition and competences of these organs are largely similar to those from 
other regions. The executive council is constituted of the chief executive, the deputy chief executive and 
members of heads of executive regional office (Art 58(1) of BGRS constitution). The controlling power of the 
parliament over the executive is reflected in the provision that the executive council is accountable to the 
regional legislative council (Art 57(2) of BGRS constitution). In this regard, chief executive (the regional 
president) is elected by and from among the members of the state council (Art 60(1) of BGRS constitution). The 
chief executive draws up a list with nominees for the executive council and submits this list for approval of the 
state council (Art 61(1/f) of BGRS constitution). According to Art 59 of BGRS constitution, the regional 
executive council have the following major powers and functions such as:-  
- To ensure the implementation of laws enacted and decisions passed by the regional state council and 
federal government and issue regulations and directives 
- To draw-up the annual budget, and submit to the regional state council, implement the same upon 
approval 
- To formulate economic and social policies and strategies of the regional state, submit draft laws to the 
regional state council and implement same upon approval 
Chris and Christopher (2014) argued that fair and just consideration and representation of people in 
executive organs of the government is also one manifestation of any democratic government. As stated 
elsewhere in this paper, Art 39(3) of FDRE constitution unequivocally recognized “every nation, nationality and 
people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish 
institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal 
government.”  
In this regard, it is widely accepted by political analysts and policy-makers that federalism with genuine 
power sharing is the most viable democratic means of managing conflict in countries with deep divisions, where 
ethno-nationalist groups are politically mobilized and identity is politically salient. Power sharing is necessary to 
prevent dominant groups or communities from subjugating others. Hence, as stated elsewhere in this paper the 
establishment and strengthening of the power-sharing mechanisms in different institutions from the local to the 
federal level in diversified state seems a precondition to cement unity in diversity and promote democracy at all 
levels. This principle can be broadened to state that regional institutions should reflect existing diversity on the 
ground. In spite of this fact, currently the regional executive council is predominantly controlled by indigenous 
ethnic groups. The regional constitution does not provide for a guaranteed representation of ethnic groups in the 
regional executive council. The total number of the members of the regional cabinet in BGRS is 17 (empirical 
data gathered in the council’s office by the researcher, 2016, Assosa). Accordingly, all indigenous ethnic groups 
have representation in regional executive council in BGRS. In this regard, currently the composition of ethnic 
groups in the regional executive council indicates that 5 members were nominated for the Bertha, 5 members 
form the Gumuz, 4 members form the Shinasha and 3 members from the Mao and Komo ethnic groups (ibid). 
Therefore, at this point it is quite clear that non-indigenous ethnic groups have no representation in regional 
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executive council, which means that the regional executive council is entirely controlled by indigenous ethnic 
groups. But in contrast, as stated above effective representation of various ethnic groups in various regional 
institutions has a profound effect to enhance sense of regional unity in diversity. Thus, actual ethnic 
representation and participation in various political institutions will enable all ethnic groups to take charge of 
their own affairs and accordingly it enhances harmony among the ethnic groups. In multi-ethnic areas as much as 
possible all ethnic groups should effectively be included in various political institutions at different levels of 
government, because it has the potential to minimize or eliminate ethnic conflict/tension.  
In this context, beside interview information, this study attempted to survey the existing perception of civil 
servants regarding the representation of ethnic diversities in regional executive council and its effect on regional 
unity of BGRS. Accordingly, the survey result shows that currently the prevention of the representation of non-
indigenous in the regional executive council has been perceived as one major source of regional disunity. For 
instance, the results in the table 1.4 below show that a significant majority (85%) of the respondents argued that 
prevention of the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups under the regional executive council in BGRS 
was perceived as one major source to regional disunity, while very few respondents (8.5%) did not agree that 
this was a source to regional disunity in BGRS.  
Table 1.4. The Perception of Civil Servants Regarding the Effect of Absence of Representation of Ethnic 
Diversities in the Regional Executive Council vis-à-vis Regional Unity in BGRS.   
{QUESTION}: In your perception, absence of the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in executive 
council at the regional level is conceived as a source to regional disunity? 
 
 
 
Valid 
Rank Scale Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 203 53.6 55.3 55.3 
Agree 119 31.4 32.4 87.7 
Undecided 13 3.4 3.5 91.3 
Disagree 26 6.9 7.1 98.4 
Strongly disagree 6 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 367 96.8 100.0  
Missing System  12 3.2   
Total  379 100.0   
Source: Survey data, 2016-2017 
Information gained from interview with higher regional officials reveal that, the main rationale behind the 
complete exclusion of non-indigenous ethnic group representation in the regional executive council was 
basically to break the non-indigenous ethnic group monopoly on regional government jobs and the regional 
economy. As stated above, currently in BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups are significantly dominating the 
business sectors in the region (Interview conducted with expert in BGRS trade, industry and transport bureau 
(2017), Assosa). Apart from this, most of the civil service and judiciary positions were highly dominated by non-
indigenous ethnic groups. The participation of indigenous ethnic groups in civil service, judicial positions and 
business sectors are still minimal in BGRS. In this regard, deliberate deterrence of the representation of non-
indigenous in the regional executive council was one basic mechanism to counterbalance the socio-economic 
dominance of non-indigenous ethnic groups in BGRS. But in contrast, the hitherto evidence indicates that, in 
BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups unambiguously claim for representation in the regional executive council. 
In addition to this, the legislative council formation mainly as a result of the “first-past-the-post” electoral 
mode of choosing nominees in ethnically diversified state in its part may further exclude non-indigenous ethnic 
groups in the executive council by using the system of executive council formation policies possibly aimed at the 
exclusion of non-indigenous ethnic communities in the region. Because in BGRS there is no clear cut power-
sharing mechanism among the ethnic groups, nevertheless, all the indigenous groups are represented in the 
regional executive council. As a result, sometimes some indigenous ethnic group political elites have posed 
complaints concerning proportional representation within executive council. In fact, this has happened because 
of the individual’s interest to seize power on behalf of their own ethnic groups.  
Consociational approaches aim to treat conflicting communities as the basic building blocks of political 
engagement by institutionalizing them as distinctive or separate entities within the power sharing framework. 
Federalism with power sharing scheme within the executive institutions at different levels of government is very 
crucial in BGRS. Because it enables ethnic groups to influence policy-making and enable them to decide issues 
related to language, education and culture, and the groups are believed to contribute to political stability of the 
region. In multi-ethnic states, genuine power sharing in different institutions could remain a vital tool to manage 
ethnic conflicts and accordingly to promote unity.  
Indeed, as claimed by various scholars the biggest risk of this model is that the coalition formed after 
challenging negotiations may easily collapse and thus the polity will have a fragile government. Trust and co-
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operation among the ethnic group actors is a precondition for the successful operation of power sharing model in 
multi-ethnic states. Furthermore, power sharing assumes that each segment should be loyal to the respective state 
beyond its ethnic groups. Here, it acknowledges double loyalty (loyalty to the state and to the respective ethnic 
group). But as argued by Assefa (2012) to be effective power sharing, loyalty to the state must somehow prevail 
over loyalty to the respective ethnic group. Beside this, he also asserted that it is hardly possible to have effective 
power sharing unless the political elite shows a clear commitment to it and is willing to ‘give and take’ (ibid). At 
least major political elites should basically consider power sharing useful and necessary.  
However, in practice these above mentioned preconditions are missing in BGRS as there is strong mistrust 
among the political elite owing to differing historical narrations and varying conceptions about the future. For 
instance, different ethnic groups particularly indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups in the region are 
represented by different political parties that indicate the groups are not internally cohesive. Even sometimes in 
the same political party there exist political disagreements among indigenous ethnic groups.  
1.6.3 Regional Judicial Organ and Ethnic Composition  
In the contemporary Ethiopian federation states enjoy not only legislative and executive functions but also 
judicial functions. In this regard, Art 67(1) of the BGRS constitution stipulates that “the judicial power of the 
region is vested in the state supreme court.” The regional judicial organ is organized into a three-tier structure 
that comprises the state Supreme Court, High Court, and First Instance Courts (refer Art 68(1) of BGRS 
constitution). The president and deputy-president of the regional Supreme Court are appointed by the Regional 
Council, after being nominated by the regional President (see Art 81(3) FDRE constitution). The other remaining 
regional judges are also appointed by the regional parliament, upon the recommendation of the State Judicial 
Administration Council (ibid, Art 81(4 and 5)). However, with regard to the regional Supreme Court and the 
regional High Courts, the State Judicial Administration Council is obliged, before submitting its 
recommendation to the regional parliament, to ask for the advisory opinion of the Federal Judicial 
Administration Council (refer Art 81 (4) of FDRE constitution and Art 69 (3) of BGRS constitution). 
In a divided society, fair representation of people in the political system is not limited to legislative and 
executive organs of the government. But different government institutions which run political and non-political 
matters shall also reflect the existing ethno-cultural dynamics of that political community to enhance the sense of 
unity among various communities. This idea has been strongly affirmed by various scholars. In support of this 
argument for instance, Lijphart (2004: 105) apparently asserted that in divided societies, inclusive representation 
of all communal groups is essential not only in cabinets and parliaments, but also in the civil service, judiciary, 
police and military institutions. 
Despite the absence of discrimination on basis of recruitment and appointment of judges in BGRS there is 
also no provision in the constitution of BGRS that contains guaranteed ethnic representation in judicial organ 
under the region. Constitutionally, any ethnic groups have the opportunity to be appointed as a judge in BGRS. 
But assume that following violent ethnic conflict, members of one community may not accept a decision from a 
judge from another community, even if the decision is sound. In this regard, the multi-ethnic composition of the 
courts can reduce this basic mistrust among the community. Therefore, in multi-ethnic states as much as possible 
all ethnic groups should effectively be included under judicial institutions at different levels of government, 
because in its part it has the potential to minimize or eliminate ethnic suspicion.  
Interview conducted with state council advisors reveal that both indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic 
groups are appointed as judges in different levels of court under the region. Since, during a recruitment ethnic 
background is not taken into account. However, anyone whose educational status, ethical background, 
competence and age meet the standard set by the judicial organ can be nominated and appointed. In this regard, 
currently there are total of 135 judges in the region, of this 70 judges were appointed from indigenous ethnic 
groups while 65 were from non-indigenous ethnic groups (Data gathered from the office of BGRS Supreme 
Court, 2018, Assosa). Here it is quite clear that, non-indigenous ethnic groups had significant representation 
under judicial institutions in BGRS. Therefore, based on this empirical information one can claim that the 
composition of indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups are fairly balanced in judicial institutions under 
BGRS. In fact, the participation of some indigenous ethnic groups in the regional judicial institutions is 
insignificant relative to their population number. For instance, the appointed judges from the Bertha, Mao and 
Komo ethnic groups are 15, 1 and none respectively in the region.  
Beyond interview and pertinent legal document analysis, this study has attempted to survey the existing 
perception of civil servants concerning the composition of ethnic diversities in judicial institution and its effect 
on the current regional unity of BGRS. Accordingly, the survey result shows that presently limited participation 
of some indigenous ethnic groups in judicial institution has been taken as a source to regional disunity of BGRS. 
For instance, the results in the table 1.5 below show that a significant majority (78.9%) of the respondents 
viewed that limited participation of some indigenous ethnic groups in judicial institutions in BGRS was 
perceived as a source of regional disunity, while few respondents (11.4%) did not agree that this was a source of 
regional disunity in BGRS.  
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Table 1.5. The Perception of Civil Servants Regarding the Composition of Ethnic Diversities in Judiciary vis-à-
vis Regional Unity in BGRS.   
{QUESTION}: In your perception, limited participation of some indigenous ethnic groups in judiciary is 
conceived as a source to regional disunity? 
 
 
 
Valid 
Rank Scale Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 172 45.4 46.9 46.9 
Agree 127 33.5 34.6 81.5 
Undecided 25 6.6 6.8 88.3 
Disagree 40 10.6 10.9 99.2 
Strongly disagree 3 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 367 96.8 100.0  
Missing System  12 3.2   
Total  379 100.0   
Source: Survey data, 2016-2017 
1.6.4 Constitutional Interpretation Commission 
In addition to legislative, executive and judicial institutions, there are also other regional institutions which are 
very important to promote unity out of diversity in the region. Among these, constitutional interpretation 
commission (CIC) is one important institution which is designed to promote the shared-rule. According to BGRS 
constitution, the power to interpret the regional constitution is vested in the hands of regional CIC, which 
comprises four representatives drawn from each indigenous nationalities of the region (see Art 71 of BGRS 
constitution). It is also empowered to decide constitutional disputes raised within the region (ibid).  
As stated supra effective representation of various ethnic groups in various regional institutions has a 
profound effect to enhance sense of regional unity in diversity. This means, among other things, in multi-ethnic 
state recognition of the representation of ethnic diversity has been considered as glue to enhance sense of unity. 
Thus, actual ethnic representation and participation in various political institutions will enable all ethnic groups 
to take charge of their own affairs and accordingly it enhances harmony among various ethnic groups. As per the 
regional constitution, the maximum number of members of CIC is twenty (see Art 71(1) of BGRS constitution). 
But until now, CIC could not come to effect in BGRS. 
In this context, constitutionally it seems like that the establishment of the CIC in BGRS aims to promote the 
ethnic diversity of the region like a house of federation at the federal level of government. Since, members of 
CIC are drawn from each indigenous ethnic group of the region. In this regard, BGRS constitution has 
empowered all indigenous ethnic groups to have four representatives equally irrespective of population size 
under CIC (ibid). But in contrast, non-indigenous ethnic groups have no representation in CIC. The 
representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in CIC are not recognized under BGRS constitution. Which 
means in BGRS CIC is entirely controlled by indigenous ethnic groups. But as claimed by Lijphart (2004) in 
divided society fair representation of various ethnic cleavages in different government institutions which run 
political and non-political matters is very essential in itself to enhance the sense of unity among various societies.  
CIC in BGRS is assisted by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry/CCI (see Art 73 of BGRS constitution 
and Proclamation No.74/2008 of Benishangul Gumuz region). It has the constitutional power to advise CIC. 
According to BGRS constitution, CCI comprise eleven members (see Art 72(2) of BGRS constitution). 
Accordingly, the members of CCI include: President and vice-President of the regional supreme court who also 
serve respectively as chairman and vice chairman of the CCI, six legal experts appointed by the chief 
administrator of the region on recommendation by the regional council, who shall have proven professional 
competence and high moral standing members, and three representatives elected from among members of 
regional council upon the recommendation of the speaker (ibid). Accordingly, as per Art 73 of BGRS 
constitution and proclamation number 74/2008 the major powers and duties guaranteed to CCI are:  
1) To investigate constitutional disputes according to the constitution. It also investigates constitutional 
disputes and should the council, upon consideration of the matter, find it necessary to interpret the 
constitution, it shall submit its recommendations thereon to the Commission 
2) Where any regional law is contested as being unconstitutional and such a dispute is submitted to it by 
any court or interested party, the council shall consider the matter and submit it to the Commission for a 
final decision 
3) When issues of constitutional interpretation arise in the courts, the Council shall:  
 Remand the case to the concerned court if it finds that there is no need for constitutional 
interpretation;  
 Submit its recommendations to Commission for a final decision if it believes that there is a need 
for constitutional interpretation  
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In BGRS CCI in its composition differs from the CIC because there is no any provision in the constitution 
of BGRS that contain guaranteed ethnic group representation under CCI. The regional constitution is silent about 
the ethnic representation in CCI. Hence, constitutionally any ethnic groups of the region have opportunity to be 
appointed in the CCI. But as interview conducted with advisors of state council speakers reveals that, CCI has 
not yet been established in BGRS.  
 
1.7 Ethnic Representation at Woreda Government in BGRS   
The FDRE constitution explicitly prescribes the establishment of lower levels of government in the regional 
states. But the power to establish lower levels of government has been explicitly provided to the regional states. 
Beside this, the FDRE constitution has also obliged the regional states to grant adequate power to the lowest 
units of government. For example, Art 50(4) of the FDRE constitution has clearly stipulated that “state 
government shall be established at state and other administrative levels that they find necessary. Adequate power 
shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the 
administration of such units.”  
Arguably, constitutional recognition of local government as the order of government can be linked with the 
realization of the country’s ethnic groups to the right of self-determination, which is a key element of the 
Ethiopian federal political setup. Because Art 39(3) of FDRE constitution unequivocally recognized “every 
nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the 
right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state 
and federal government”. For instance, in a similar vein Art 39(2) of BGRS constitution vividly recognized the 
nation or nationality of the regional state to self-administration within its own defined territory and accordingly 
to exercise self-rule and fair representation in the political institutions of the region.  
Thus, based on the above constitutional provisions, the researcher claims that Woreda administration is one 
important tiers of the government designed to effect self-administration of ethnic communities at lower tiers of 
government. In this context, by considering  the FDRE constitution, currently all regional states have  organized 
Woredas and  Kebeles administrations as legitimate  units  of  local  government  with  legally  defined  authority  
and functions. The 2002 revised constitution of BGRS has clearly recognized and organized Woreda 
administration as one order of government in the region. For instance, according to proclamation No. 86/2002 of 
BGRS, the region has 20 Woredas. However, the total population size of each Woreda in the region is not 
uniform, which means it varies from Woreda to Woreda. In addition to this, there are different ethnic groups 
inhabiting in each Woreda administration of the region. But the nature and magnitude of ethnic diversity is not 
similar in each Woreda  
Constitutionally, the major powers and functions granted to Woreda levels of government under BGRS are: 
to draw up and determine plans of economic development and social service  within its own territorial area and 
implement policies, laws, regulations and directives issued by the regional state within its own administration 
(Art 85(1&2). Furthermore, the regional constitution clearly indicates that each and every Woreda is a body 
hierarchically subordinate to the regional executive (ibid). The Woreda government in BGRS has been organized 
with different organs such as, legislative, executive and judicial organs. In BGRS the Woreda government 
structure replicates regional government and nationality administration structures. For example, alike the 
regional and nationality administration, each Woreda government in the region adopted a parliamentary form of 
government.  
The BGRS constitution guaranteed the legislative authority of the Woreda administration to a Woreda 
council, while the administrative power of the Woreda is provided to the Woreda administrative council and its 
cabinets. The judicial power of the Woreda government is vested in the hands of first instance court. Here, it is 
possible to claim that Woreda level of government is one basic institutional framework through which ethnic 
communities of the region can exercise their right of self-administration at the lower level of the government. 
Institutions of Woreda government are one main avenue through which sense of unity among the ethnic groups 
can be pursued. The Woreda level institutions should facilitate inclusiveness in terms of the structure to promote 
unity. Therefore, in the following section the powers and duties of each organ of Woreda administration will be 
discussed in detail. In addition to this, the ethnic composition of each organ of Woreda administration will be 
assessed in each selected Woreda of the region.  
1.7.1 Woreda Legislative Council    
In BGRS, Woreda level of government has legislative power. The legislative authority of the Woreda 
administration is vested in the hands of Woreda council, which is the highest organ in the Woreda administration. 
It is a body directly elected with plurality electoral system because the members of this council are 
representatives of the People of the Woreda as a whole and they are elected for a term of five years through 
direct elections (refer Art 86 (1) and Art 90 (3) of BGRS constitution). It is accountable to the council of 
nationalities or the state council as the case may be (see Article 87 (1) of BGRS constitution). The major powers 
and functions of the Woreda council in BGRS as stated in Article 87 of BGRS constitution are: 
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1) Approve economic development, social services and administrative plans, programs and budget of the 
Woreda 
2) Follow up the timely undertaking of the basic agricultural development activities in the Woreda, and to 
ensure that special attention is given to the accomplishment of the task with regard to the development, 
protection and preservation of natural resources. 
3) Without prejudice to the Federal and Regional constitutions and other laws, issue detailed directives to 
ensure the peace and security of the Woreda 
4) Call for questioning the chief administrator including other officials of the Woreda and evaluate the 
performance of the executive organ.  
Thus, the Woreda council is constitutionally empowered to enact Woreda level government laws/directives 
necessary or incidental to the exercise of Woreda powers and performance of allocated functions. The Woreda 
council is also constitutionally mandated to exercise oversight over the Woreda executive council. It has powers 
to approve the budget and expenditure of the Woreda government. It also reviews and approves management and 
development plans prepared by the Woreda executive council, as well as plans for the management and 
exploitation of the Woreda’s resources. Consequently, to discharge these assigned responsibilities each Woreda 
council has its own office. Accordingly, by the recommendation of the political party with majority seats in the 
council, the council elects the speaker and deputy speakers. The speakers are accountable to the respective 
Woreda council. Deputy speaker acts in the absence of chief speaker. Accordingly, they have responsibility to 
call and chair the council meetings. Interview conducted with the respondents in the selected Woreda 
substantiate that both speakers are paid employees in the Woreda council. Conversely, the rest of the Woreda 
councilors are the unpaid employees of the council (ibid). Perhaps, some members of the council might be 
permanent employees in one of the sector offices of Woreda administration (ibid). 
In accordance with FDRE constitution, every ethnic group has the right to be represented in the federal and 
regional government (see Art 39(3)). It is also clearly provided in proclamation No. 7 (1992) that an ethnic 
community has the right to be represented in the Woreda council if it does not have a Woreda of its own. Based 
on the above provisions, in BGRS some seats were reserved by using a quota system for non-indigenous ethnic 
groups at the Woreda council to ensure their representation where the electoral process does not guarantee their 
representation. In fact, the above selected Woredas were basically multi-ethnic Woredas of the region. It means 
that there is no single ethnic group which constitute a majority in the above selected Woreda administrations. 
Here territorial autonomy is not the viable option for ethnically diversified Woredas of the region. Thus, in 
multi-ethnic states the institutional design that typically echo the existing diversities by acknowledging the 
representation of diverse ethnic groups in different levels of government is considered as one key means to 
enhance peaceful coexistence among the ethnic cleavages. 
Table 1.7. Ethnic Group Composition in the Woreda Council (2015 Woreda Election) 
No  Name of Woreda’s Broad Ethnic Category  Number of Representatives   Total   
1 Bambasi Indigenous  63 115 
Non- Indigenous 52 
2 Dangure 
 
Indigenous  88 130 
Non- Indigenous 42 
3 Assosa Indigenous  108 184 
Non- Indigenous 76 
4 Debati Indigenous  100 140 
Non- Indigenous 40 
5 Wombera Indigenous  111 139 
Non- Indigenous 28 
Source: Data collected by the researcher in selected Woredas of the region  
The BGRS constitution does not provide for a guaranteed representation of ethnic groups in the Woreda 
legislative council. However, in spite of this fact, the practice indicates that non-indigenous ethnic groups have a 
significant number of representatives in the Woreda legislative council in most of multi-ethnic Woredas. For 
example, from the above table one can easily understand that in the ethnically diversified Woreda’s of the region 
non-indigenous ethnic groups have a significant representation in the Woreda council. Nevertheless, indigenous 
ethnic groups had a majority of representation and seats in all of the above selected Woreda councils of the 
region. Therefore, at this point it is invalid to generalize that non-indigenous ethnic groups are fairly represented 
in the Woreda council. Since in accordance with their high population number in the above selected Woredas of 
the region, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in each Woreda council is not this much fair.  
Nevertheless, to discharge the entrusted responsibility effectively, each Woreda council has been 
empowered to organize different standing committees in the respective Woreda council. All standing committees 
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are accountable to the corresponding Woreda council and speaker. As per proclamation No. 86/2002 of the 
region, the total members of each standing committee have to be at least three in number (see Art 29 of the 
Proclamation No. 86/2002 of BGRS). Thus, data gathered from the Woreda’s indicate that, currently all Woreda 
councils have five standing committees for each sector institutions of Woreda administration. Namely law, 
governance and justice affairs standing committee, government economy, budget and finance affairs standing 
committee, capacity building and social affairs standing committee, women’s, youth public affairs 
communication standing committee and economic affairs standing committee. Thus, in accordance with Art 29 
of the Proclamation No. 86/2002 of BGRS, the major responsibilities and functions of the standing committees 
of the Woreda council are:  
1) To investigate and supervise the proper implementation of the country, regional and Woreda plan, laws 
and strategy in the Woreda 
2) Follow up and oversight the practical application of the allocated budget in accordance with the plan in 
Woreda 
3) Supervise and secure the applicability of the rights and freedoms of citizens in the Woreda  
Based on the following table below, one can easily understand that non-indigenous ethnic groups have 
significant representation in standing committees of each Woreda council where they are significant in number. 
Therefore, at this juncture, it is justified to generalize that, non-indigenous ethnic groups were fairly represented 
in the standing committees of the Woreda council. Indeed, in multi-ethnic state representation of ethnic diversity 
at different levels of government is essential to achieve unity. Ethnic communities that are excluded at the 
regional level of government could also be accommodated in local government institutions to address some part 
of the perception of exclusion that underlies ethnic tension in multi-ethnic areas. In fact, the involvement of 
various ethnic groups in political processes in multi-ethnic states is basically aimed at enhancing the quality of 
representative democracy. Therefore, currently in multi-ethnic Woredas of the region, various ethnic 
communities were significantly represented in Woreda council standing committees.  
1.7.2 Woreda Executive Council   
The executive power of Woreda administration is vested in the hands of Woreda Administrative Council, which 
is accountable to the Chief Administrator and Woreda Council (see Art 91 (1) of revised BGRS constitution). 
Each Woreda Administrative Council is comprised of Chief and Deputy Chief Administrator as well as heads of 
line sector offices which are accountable to the regional administrative council in addition to the Woreda 
Council (ibid: sub-Art 2). Accordingly, each Woreda Administrative Office comprises nine sector offices namely, 
Capacity Building and Civil Service Offices, Revenue and Customs Office, Governance, Security and Justice 
Coordination Office, Militia Office, Economy and Finance Office, Administrative Office, Women’s, Youth 
Public Affairs Communication Office, HIV/AIDS Prevention and Protection Office, and Justice Office; each of 
these offices are headed by Woreda Cabinet members which are nominated by Woreda Administrator and 
approved by the Woreda Council. The major powers and functions assigned to the Woreda Administrative 
council in BGRS as per Art 92 (1) of BGRS constitution are: 
1) To implement policies, laws, regulation, directives, plans and programmers issued by the federal 
government and the regional State; 
2) To coordinate the executive organs of the Woreda, follow up and direct their activities; 
3) To draw up the Woreda’s annual budget, submit it to the Woreda council and implement it upon 
approval. 
4) To draw up socio-economic and administrative plans and submit it to Woreda council for approval and 
implement same upon approval.  
Generally, the executive council in each Woreda administration plays political and administrative role and 
they have an important role in implementing the decision of the Woreda council in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the Woreda. The executive council has also the power to implement policies, laws, regulations, 
directions, plans and programs issued by the federal government and the regional state. In addition, they 
coordinate the executive organs of the Woredas, make follow up and direct, collect land use payment, 
agricultural income tax and other incomes. Based on the law, they prepare fiscal and financial plans and submit 
it to the Woreda council and implement it on approval. 
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Table 1.9. Selected Woreda’s Executive Council and Their Ethnic Composition (2015 Regional Election). 
No Woreda  Total No. of cabinets Ethnic category No. of representation 
1 Bambasi 14 Indigenous  13 
Non- Indigenous 1 
2 Dangure 
 
14 Indigenous  13 
Non- Indigenous 1 
3 Assosa 14 Indigenous  13 
Non- Indigenous 1 
4 Debati 14 Indigenous  13 
Non- Indigenous 1 
5 Wombera 14 Indigenous  13 
Non- Indigenous 1 
Source: Data collected by the researcher  
The BGRS constitution does not provide for a guaranteed representation of ethnic groups in the Woreda 
executive council. In fact, in these regions where ethnic diversities are highly salient, the representational rights 
of ethnic groups should not be limited to the legislative branches of government; the executive and other 
institutions such as civil service, judiciary, police, and military should also reflect the existing ethnic diversity to 
indorse the sense of unity among the ethnic segments. Nonetheless, the hitherto practice in the region apparently 
indicates that in those ethnically diversified Woredas of the region, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic 
groups in Woreda executive council are insignificant. This is because of the presence of high socio-economic 
disparity between indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups in the region. For instance, illiteracy level is still 
quite high among indigenous ethnic groups compared with non-indigenous in the region. 
Actually, literacy rate is one basic indicator of socioeconomic development among the society. As stated 
elsewhere in this paper, in BGRS non-indigenous ethnic groups have significantly dominated the business 
sectors. Beside this, currently most of the civil service positions were highly dominated by non-indigenous 
ethnic groups. The participation of indigenous ethnic groups in civil service institutions and business sectors is 
still minimal in BGRS.  
Therefore, based on the above stated argument, this study tried to survey the perception of civil servants in 
the region regarding the economic disparity between indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups on interethnic 
unity under the region. Thus, the survey result shows that currently the prevalence of economic inequality 
between indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups has been considered as one major source of interethnic 
disunity in the region. For instance, as presented quite clearly in table 1.10 below, a majority (69.7%) of the 
respondents perceived that the economic discrepancy between indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups 
under BGRS was perceived as a source of regional disunity, while few respondents (18%) did not agree that this 
was a source of regional disunity in the region.  
Table 1.10. The Perception of Civil Servants Regarding the Effect of Economic Discrepancy among Ethnic 
Groups vis-à-vis Regional Unity under BGRS.   
{QUESTION}: In your perception, the prevalence of economic discrepancy between indigenous and non-
indigenous ethnic groups at Woreda level is conceived as a source to interethnic disunity? 
                
 
 
Valid 
Rank Scale Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly agree 194 51.2 52.9 52.9 
Agree 70 18.5 19.1 71.9 
Undecided 35 9.2 9.5 81.5 
Disagree 37 9.8 10.1 91.6 
Strongly disagree 31 8.2 8.4 100.0 
Total 367 96.8 100.0  
Missing System  12 3.2   
Total  379 100.0   
Source: Survey data, 2016-2017 
In the same way, this study tried to survey the perception of civil servants in the region concerning 
inadequate representation of ethnic diversities in executive council at Woreda levels of government and its effect 
on interethnic unity in BGRS. Accordingly, the survey result shows that currently the restriction of the 
representation of non-indigenous in the executive council at Woreda levels of government has been considered 
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as a source of interethnic disunity in the region. For instance, the results in the table 1.11 below show that a 
significant majority (85%) of the respondents perceived that absence of proportional representation of non-
indigenous ethnic groups under the executive council at Woreda levels of government in the region was 
perceived as a source to interethnic disunity, while very few respondents (8.5%) did not agree that this was a 
source to regional disunity in the region.  
Table 1.11. The Perception of Civil Servants Regarding the Effect of Absence of Proportional Representation of 
Ethnic Diversities in Executive Council vis-à-vis Regional Unity in BGRS.   
{QUESTION}: In your perception, presence of inadequate representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in 
executive council at Woreda level is conceived as a source to interethnic disunity? 
 
 
 
Valid 
Rank Scale Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly agree 203 53.6 55.3 55.3 
Agree 119 31.4 32.4 87.7 
Undecided 13 3.4 3.5 91.3 
Disagree 26 6.9 7.1 98.4 
Strongly disagree 6 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 367 96.8 100.0  
Missing System  12 3.2   
Total  379 100.0   
Source: Survey data, 2016-2017 
However, the majority of interview respondents similarly explained that, notwithstanding the fact that until 
now, non-indigenous ethnic groups have a political request for proportional representation in the executive 
council at Woreda levels of government, the main reason why the regional government deliberately restricted the 
representation of non-indigenous in the executive council at different levels of government in the region was 
because it  was taken as a special mechanism to counterbalance the socioeconomic domination of non-
indigenous ethnic groups in the regional state. Yet, both inadequate representation of non-indigenous ethnic 
groups in the executive council and the prevalence of socio-economic inequality between indigenous and non-
indigenous ethnic groups at Woreda levels of government have on their part significantly affected the political 
stability of the region.  
As stated elsewhere in this paper, actual ethnic representation and participation in local political institutions 
will enable all ethnic groups to take charge of their own affairs and accordingly it enhances harmony among the 
ethnic groups. In multi-ethnic areas as much as possible all ethnic groups should be effectively included in 
various political institutions at different levels of government, which has the potential to minimize or eliminate 
ethnic conflict/tension. However, the practice on the ground in BGRS shows that in multi-ethnic Woredas of the 
region, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups have been restricted in the Woreda 
administrative/executive council.  
 
1.8 Ethnic Representation in Kebele Level of Administration under BGRS   
Similar to other regional states, in BGRS Kebele level of government is the lowest unit of administration 
following to the Woreda administration. The Kebele level of administration is accountable to the city or Woreda 
council. According to Art 97 (2) of the 2002 revised BGRS constitution, the Kebele level of administration is 
structured into Kebele council, Kebele administrative council and social court. The Kebele council is the highest 
authority under Kebele level of administration. The members of the Kebele council are directly elected by the 
respective Kebele residents and they are accountable to the people who elected them (Article 98 (1) BGRS 
revised constitution). The Kebele council is composed of the speaker and deputy speaker of the house; and the 
number of members of the council is determined by national election law of Ethiopia, the regional constitution 
and proclamation in accordance with number of each Kebele residents.  
As stated above, the other branch of government at the Kebele level of administration is Kebele 
administrative council, which is the executive organ of government under Kebele administration. Kebele 
administrative council comprises the administrator and deputy administrator and workers elected from social 
service-rendering governmental institutions within the Kebele administration. Kebele administrator is appointed 
by the Kebele council upon the recommendation by political party or parities with majority seat in the council 
and the deputy administrator and other administrative councils are nominated by the Kebele administrator and 
approved by the Kebele council.  
According to Art 99 of BGRS constitution some major powers and functions guaranteed to Keble Council 
in the region are: 
1) Implement the plans and directives issued from time to time by the Woreda Council and Woreda 
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Administrative Council within its Kebele and may issue working directives of the Kebele. 
2) Issue directives on social matters and implement it regulation, and directives issued by it superior 
Administrator organs.  
3) Issue detailed guidelines for the implementation of the socio-economic and administrative plans and 
programmes issued to it by its superior organs and follow up the implementation of these plans and 
programmes. 
4) Ensure the preservation of peace and security as well as the maintenance of law and order. 
Empirical evidence gained by the researcher shows that the Kebele institutions do not fully exercising their 
powers and duties guaranteed by the regional constitution. Like regional and Woreda levels of government, 
Kebele council in BGRS had standing committees namely; law, governance and justice affairs standing 
committee, economy, budget and finance affairs standing committees, capacity building and social affairs 
standing committee, and women’s, youth public affairs communication standing committee whose members are 
5-7 depending on the necessity of man power needed for that committee. Actually, non-indigenous ethnic groups 
are significantly represented in both Kebele council and Kebele administrative council under multi-ethnic 
Woredas of the region. For instance, in Dangure Woreda out of the total 3178 representatives in all Kebele 
councils of the Woreda, 1218 representatives were from non-indigenous ethnic groups and also in Assosa 
Woreda out of the total 6681 representatives in each Kebele councils of the Woreda, 3668 representatives were 
from non-indigenous ethnic groups. The same trend exists in Bambasi, Debati and Wombera Woredas in BGRS.  
In fact, under contemporary BGRS if the residents of certain Kebele are dominated by non-indigenous 
ethnic groups, the majority of representatives under both the Kebele council and Kebele Administrative Council 
are non-indigenous ethnic groups while, if the residents are dominated by indigenous ethnic groups, the majority 
of representatives in the Kebele corresponding councils are indigenous ethnic groups. However, if the Kebele 
residents are mixed (indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups), the corresponding representatives in both 
councils are drown from both indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic groups.   
Generally, non-indigenous ethnic groups are in a better manner accommodated at the Kebele level of 
government than regional and Woreda levels of government under BGRS. Because it is an actual fact that non-
indigenous ethnic groups are significantly represented in the Kebele councils and administrative councils in 
BGRS political dynamics.  
 
1.9 Conclusion  
In Ethiopia the adoption of a federal political state structure aims at accommodating ethnic diversity and 
simultaneously nurturing national unity via shared-institutions. Federalism as the institutional arrangement has 
opted primarily to realize the challenges of ethnic diversity in the country. For example, according to FDRE 
constitution every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government 
which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable 
representation in state and federal governments (Art 39(3)). Therefore, all ethnic groups have a full right to be 
represented in all institutions of regional and the respective local governments. In this regard, regional states are 
also responsible to recognize and promote the existing diversity based on their own specific local context.  
The constitution of BGRS has clearly stated that the regional government shall be organized with four 
hierarchically structured tiers of government. These are regional government, nationality administration, Woreda 
and Kebele administrations (Art 45(1) of BGRS constitution). All these tiers of government under the region 
have been empowered to have their own legislative, executive as well as judicial institutions under their 
respective jurisdictions. Actually, each tier of government has its own institutions and agencies in which 
decisions and decision making process are carried out.  
The regional state council is representative of the nation, nationalities and people of the regional state as a 
whole and its members are accountable to the people, constitution and their conscience (see Proclamation No. 
31/2002, Article 48 (3) of BGRS). Currently, BGRS council consists of 99 councilors elected directly by the 
regional people through free, direct and fair elections in secret ballot for a term of five years in each electoral 
district by using the FPTP electoral system (see Art 48(1&2) of BGRS constitution). In this context, data 
gathered by the researcher (2016) reveal that the current practice shows that out of the total 99 seats 40 seats are 
reserved for Bertha, 35 are reserved for Gumuz, 11 are reserved for Shinasha, 2 are reserved for Mao and 2 for 
Komo and other 9 seats are reserved for non-indigenous ethnic groups by the ‘quota’ base. Indeed, the base of 
this quota system is not the imperative of the regional constitution or other legal document, rather it has been the 
voluntary decision of ruling regional based political party to accommodate non-indigenous ethnic groups in 
BGRS.  
Based on the above empirical information one cannot argue that non-indigenous ethnic groups are fairly 
represented in the regional council in accordance with their high population number in the region. Here, it is 
quite clear that the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in BGRS council is not proportional. But in 
contrast, quite obviously, effective representation of various ethnic groups in various regional institutions has a 
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profound effect to enhance sense of regional unity in diversity. However, the restriction of the representation of 
non-indigenous residents in the regional legislative council in BGRS has been perceived as one major source of 
regional disunity. In fact, according to higher officials of the region, the main rationale behind the restriction of 
non-indigenous ethnic group representation in the regional political institutions was basically to break the non-
indigenous ethnic group monopoly on regional government jobs and the regional economy. In this regard, the 
regional government position is that it is one basic mechanism to counterbalance the socio-economic dominance 
of non-indigenous ethnic groups in BGRS.  
As stated above, Chris and Christopher (2014) argued that fair and just consideration and representation of 
people in executive organs of the government is also one manifestation of any democratic government. However, 
the prevention of the representation of non-indigenous in the regional executive council in BGRS has been 
perceived as one major source to regional disunity. In a divided society, fair representation of people in the 
political system is not limited to legislative and executive organs of the government. But different government 
institutions which run political and non-political matters shall also reflect the existing ethno-cultural dynamics of 
that political community to enhance the sense of unity among various communities. In this context, another key 
issue hindering the effective representation of various ethnic groups in the legislative council at different levels 
of government in Ethiopia in general and BGRS in particular is the adopted electoral system.  
Proclamation No. 7 (1992) clearly recognized that an ethnic community has the right to be represented in 
the Woreda council if it does not have a Woreda of its own. Based on this provision, in BGRS some seats were 
reserved for non-indigenous ethnic groups at the Woreda council to ensure their representation where the 
electoral process does not guarantee their representation. The BGRS constitution does not provide for a 
guaranteed representation of ethnic groups in the Woreda legislative council. However, in spite of this fact, the 
practice indicates that non-indigenous ethnic groups have a significant number of representatives in the Woreda 
legislative council in most of multi-ethnic Woredas. Therefore, at this point it is invalid to generalize that non-
indigenous ethnic groups are fairly represented in the Woreda council. Since in accordance with their high 
population number in the above selected Woredas of the region, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic 
groups in each Woreda council is not this much fair. 
In fact, in these regions in which ethnic diversities are highly salient, the representation of ethnic diversity 
should not be limited in the legislative branches of government; the executive and other institutions such as the 
civil service, judiciary, police, and military should also reflect the existing ethnic diversity to indorse the sense of 
unity among the ethnic segments. Nonetheless, the hitherto practice in the region apparently indicates that under 
those ethnically diversified Woredas of the region, the representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in the 
Woreda executive council are insignificant. However, in contrast, non-indigenous ethnic groups are in a better 
manner accommodated at Kebele level of government than regional and Woreda levels of government under 
BGRS. Because evidences indicate that non-indigenous ethnic groups are significantly represented in the Kebele 
councils and administrative councils in BGRS political dynamics. Data gained by the researcher indicates that 
the Kebele institutions do not fully exercising their powers and duties guaranteed by the regional constitution.  
 
1.10 Implications for Policy and Practice 
The findings of the research have implications that both federal policy makers and practitioners in general and 
policy makers and practitioners of BGRS in particular need to take into account. In this regard, this study offers 
the following recommendations to policy makers and practitioners for both levels of governments: 
1) According to the FDRE constitution every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a 
full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the 
territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments (Art 39(3)). 
Therefore, all ethnic groups have a full right to be represented in all institutions of regional and the 
respective local governments. Therefore, regional states are also responsible to recognize and promote 
the existing diversity based on their own specific local context. In this regard, now BGRS government 
should reconsider and decide to increase the number of state council seats essentially to increase the 
representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups in the regional state council.    
2) This study found that non-indigenous ethnic groups are in a better manner accommodated at the Kebele 
level of government than at Woreda and regional levels of government in BGRS. Non-indigenous 
ethnic groups are not fairly represented in the regional council in accordance with their high population 
number in the region. In addition to this, under those of ethnically diversified Woredas of the region the 
representation of non-indigenous ethnic groups particularly in the Woreda executive council are 
insignificant. Failure to adequately accommodate or represent non-indigenous ethnic groups in the 
regional legislative and executive organs of the government in its part is greatly challenging the unity of 
BGRS. Equitable or proper representation and participation of non-indigenous ethnic groups, 
particularly, at the regional level political institutions has a positive side and will have a potential in its 
part to minimize community’s dissatisfaction with the political administration. On the other hand, it can 
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consolidate and strengthen sense of peaceful coexistence and sub-national unity among various ethnic 
groups in BGRS. Therefore, BGRS and other regional states of the country should revisit and review its 
strategy and policies how non-indigenous ethnic groups are represented or accommodated particularly 
in the executive institutions at Woreda and regional levels of government in the region.   
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